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ABSTRACT 
There has been a considerable increase in the penalties for drug 
trafficking following the United Nations Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs 1961, over fifty years ago. In many parts of the world, 
the sanctions are as severe as those for homicide and rape. This 
penalty escalation is at odds with the counter movement to 
decriminalise illicit drugs. Drug supplying is the only serious crime 
where there are widespread moves to decriminalize the main outcome 
of the crime—the use illicit drugs. This paper explores this paradox. It 
also examines the rationales for the increasingly harsh penalties for 
drug suppliers. We conclude that while there is no conclusive 
argument in favour of the decriminalizing drugs, the weight of 
empirical data does not establish any concrete benefits stemming 
from severe penalties for serious drug offenses. In particular, there is 
no correlation between longer prison terms for drug offenders and a 
reduction in the availability and use of drugs. We propose that the 
penalties for drug offenses should be reduced considerably. There is 
no useful objective that can be achieved by a twenty-five-year term of 
imprisonment that cannot be achieved by a term of five to ten years. 
A more measured sentencing response to serious drug offense 
penalties would make sentencing fairer and enable billions of dollars 
currently directed to imprisonment to be spent on more pressing 
community needs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview of the Fifty-Year War on Illicit Drugs 
The global “war on drugs” commenced following the United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 19611 and gained 
momentum following the clampdown on drugs by U.S. President 
Nixon more than forty years ago.2 The sharp end of the war of drugs 
 
1 All nations are parties to the Convention except Afghanistan, Chad, East Timor, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, South Sudan, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
2 See REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS 2 
(June 2011); as noted by Lauren M. Cutler in Arizona’s Drug Sentencing Statute: Is 
Rehabilitation a Better Approach to the “War on Drugs”?, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 397, 399 (2009). The author argues that the war escalated in 1982: 
Officially declared on October 2, 1982, by President Reagan in a radio address, the 
“War on Drugs” has intensified to the extent that it has affected the entire American 
criminal justice system. The theory was if law enforcement got ‘tough on crime’ by 
securing more arrests and punishing offenders with harsher penalties, it would have 
a deterrent effect, thus decreasing the net volume of drug offenses. 
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is harsh penalties for offenders involved in the distribution of drugs. 
The objective of this is to “reduce the scope and scale of drug markets 
via supply-side initiatives, particularly through tough and 
uncompromising law enforcement.”3 
In recent decades there has been an escalation in the penalties 
imposed on serious drug offenders in many parts of the world. 
Penalties exceeding twenty years of imprisonment are now 
increasingly imposed, thereby often exceeding sanctions typically 
imposed on homicide offenders. In some parts of the world, even the 
death penalty applies for drug distribution offenses. Despite a general 
international trend over the past sixty years towards an abolition of 
the death penalty, there has been an increase in the number of 
countries that have introduced the death penalty for drug offences. 
The number grew from approximately ten in 1979, to twenty-two in 
1985 and thirty-six countries in 2000.4 This is a trend that seems to be 
receding slightly recently, as a result of the general trend towards the 
abolition of capital laws.5 
There is a common political narrative to the “arms race” that has 
emerged in relation to the sentencing of serious drug offenders. Illicit 
drugs are widely available; they cause harm to users; suppliers make 
large amounts of money and harsh penalties are needed to discourage 
the trade in drugs. Moreover, people involved in the distribution of 
drugs are regarded as a scourge on the community, who profit from 
the misery of others. Not surprisingly, there is no mainstream 
opposition to increasingly harsher penalties for drug crime. 
Structure of the Article and Definitional Matters 
Although serious drug offenses are nearly universally punished 
harshly, there is no established normative or empirical justification for 
this practice. In this paper we examine the desirability of severe 
 
See also Michael A. Simons, New Voices on the War on Drugs: Departing Ways: 
Uniformity, Disparity and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921 
(2002) for an overview of the background and roll out of the war on drugs. 
3 MARCUS ROBERTS ET AL., THE BECKLEY FOUNDATION DRUG POLICY PROGRAMME, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY REDUCTION, DRUGSCOPE, REPORT THREE 2 (2004). 
4 HARM REDUCTION INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY FOR DRUG OFFENCES: 
GLOBAL OVERVIEW 2012, TIPPING THE SCALES FOR ABOLITION 5 (2012). Drug offences 
account for the most executions in Malaysia (69%) and Singapore (76%); see Andrew 
Novak, Constitutional Reform and the Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in 
Kenya, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 282, 306–07 (2012). 
5 See HARM REDUCTION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4. 
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punishment for these offenses. We do this from two different 
perspectives. 
First, we explore the paradox that exists when the sentencing of 
serious drug offenders is examined against the backdrop of the move 
to decriminalize drugs. Serious drug crime is the only heavily 
punished crime where there are considered arguments in favor of 
decriminalizing the outcome of the crime (i.e., the use of drugs). No 
such arguments exist for offenses that are at the similar end of the 
crime severity spectrum, such as homicide, rape, armed robbery and 
serious assault. As noted by Ben Mostyn et al.: 
Some offences, such as murder, sexual assault and theft, are mala in 
se (wrong in themselves). We know why these acts are criminal. 
Drug offences, on the other hand, are mala prohibita (wrong 
because prohibited). That is, the use of certain drugs is criminal 
because parliaments have proscribed it, not because we think the 
conduct is necessarily wrong in itself and deserving of punishment. 
We do not think the consumption of the drugs alcohol or nicotine or 
even caffeine is criminal and parliaments have not prohibited it to 
make it so.6 
Why is a crime which results in conduct, which some regard as being 
innately not criminal, now punished as severely as conduct that 
incontestably causes intentional gross harm to victims? Given the 
increasing support for decriminalizing the use of drugs, the logic 
underlying the imposition of harsher sentencing for the supply of 
drugs is inherently contestable. 
Secondly, we explore the rationales that the courts and legislatures 
provide for the increasingly tough drug sentences.7 The principal 
justification is the perceived need to deter people from participating in 
the drug trade. Subsidiary reasons include the need to discourage the 
offender from again committing crime and the need to protect the 
community. In sentencing terms, these rationales are termed general 
deterrence, specific deterrence and incapacitation. We examine the 
wide-ranging empirical data regarding the efficacy of punishment to 
achieve these goals. More broadly, inflicting harsh penalties on drug 
suppliers seek to reduce the availability and use of drugs and limit the 
associated supposed negative effects of drug use. The main supposed 
 
6 Ben Mostyn, Helen Gibbon & Nicholas Cowdery, The Criminalisation of Drugs and 
the Search for Alternative Approaches, 24 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 261, 262 (2012). 
7 The issue was explored extensively as a thematic concept more than twenty years ago. 
See Donald W. Dowd, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War 
Against Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REV. 301 (1995). 
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adverse effects of drug use relate to the bad health outcomes of users 
and their increased disposition to commit crime. 
There are a number of criteria upon which the success of the 
antidrug policy can be measured. Logically they map directly to the 
rationales for the harsh penalties. As with all crime, the principal 
measure of success is the extent to which the incidence of the relevant 
crime is reduced. Thus, an important consideration in evaluating 
antidrug policy is whether serious drug crime is reduced. Drug 
manufacture and supply is closely associated with organized crime 
and the availability and use of illicit drugs. Organized crime has 
numerous causes and hence it is not tenable to measure its size or 
impact as being indicative of the success of drug policy. However, 
drug availability (and use) is directly linked to the level of which 
drugs are made and distributed. Thus, the key measure upon which 
current drug sentencing policy will be measured is the extent of drug 
use in the community. 
As noted below, there are many commentators that advocate for the 
decriminalization of drugs. We do not necessarily support this 
proposition. For the sake of clarity, the new propositions that are 
canvassed in this this paper are (1) that irrespective of the legal status 
of drug use, the penalties for serious drug offenses should be reduced 
and (2) the decriminalization of drug use in many jurisdictions and 
the effects of this support a reduction in the penalties for serious drug 
offenses because decriminalization of drug use is the sine qua non for 
a revised attitude to drug offenses. 
In Part II of the paper we examine the current approach to 
sentencing serious drug offenders. In part three, we discuss the move 
toward legalization of drugs and consider the key rationales that have 
been offered to this end. We do not make a definitive conclusion 
regarding the merits of these arguments. Rather we note that the 
arguments are logically sound, have some empirical validity, and are 
pragmatically tenable. 
Part III of the paper examines whether harsh sentences are capable 
of deterring drug crime offending and protecting the community. The 
weight of the empirical data suggests that this is not feasible. 
Moreover, the harmful effects of drug trafficking are often treated 
as axiomatic, and there is a “disturbing essentialism” connected with 
this because the causal connection between drug trafficking and the 
harm caused by drug use is not always evident—meaning that the 
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imposition of severe penalties is not necessarily defensible.8 We 
conclude that increasing the sentencing tariffs for drug offenses is an 
illustration of community and political venting trumping the rational 
implementation of coherent and workable criminal justice practices. If 
drug offenses are to remain illegal (which is likely in the foreseeable 
future), there is no community benefit that can be achieved by a five- 
or ten-year term of imprisonment that cannot be achieved by a 
sentence of twenty-five years—the additional fifteen to twenty years 
is a concession to the impulsiveness and frailty of contemporary 
policy making. 
This paper examines most closely sentencing law and practice in 
the United States and Australia. The United States is an important 
jurisdiction because it imprisons the most number of drug offenders in 
the world. Australia is also examined because it is now starting to 
follow the United States trend of a considerable increase in drug 
offender jail numbers, and it is potentially a jurisdiction that is still 
amenable to evidence-based reform before it whole-heartedly 
embraces a flawed model. 
Severe penalties exist for all forms of drug offenses, except those 
relating to personal use. This paper focuses on what is loosely termed 
serious drug offenses. The paradigm serious drug offense is drug 
“trafficking” or “supplying.” Other forms of conduct relating to drugs 
that attract severe penalties are importation, possession and 
manufacture. As noted below, from the sentencing perspective there 
is no meaningful distinction between these forms of conduct. All 
attract harsh penalties. 
The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics, in calculating 
the number of offenders incarcerated for “drug crime,” states that this 
term encompasses “trafficking, possession and other drug offenses,”9 
which means “violations of laws prohibiting or regulating the 
possession, distribution, or manufacture of illegal drugs.”10 Similar 
terminology is employed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, which 
is the institution that is responsible for officially documenting 
 
8 See Andrew F. Sunter, The Harm of Drug Trafficking: Is there Room for Serious 
Debate?, 32 MAN. L.J. 174, 176 (2006); see also Peter Alldridge, Dealing with Drug 
Dealing, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 239 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds.,1996). 
9 E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, U.S Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2011 (Dec. 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
10 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Drugs and Crime, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=35 for the definition of “drug 
-defined” offenses. 
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prisoner numbers in Australia. It defines illicit drug offenses as “the 
possessing, selling, dealing or trafficking, importing or exporting, 
manufacturing or cultivating of drugs or other substances prohibited 
under legislation.” In this paper so far, we have used the phrase 
serious drug offenses to accord with the above definitions.11 
Henceforth, we use the term drug offenses. 
I 
CURRENT APPROACH TO SENTENCING DRUG OFFENDERS 
A. The Number of Drug Prisoners in the United States and Its 
Approach to the Sentencing of Drug Offenders 
As noted above, over the past few decades there has been a near 
universal trend of increasing penalties for drug offenses. This has 
been most marked in the United States. A paper by IIyana Kuziemko 
and Steven D. Levitt12 observed that in the United States in the two 
decades from 1980 to 2000 the number of offenders imprisoned for 
drug offenses increased fifteen-fold.13 
The rate of growth has declined over the most recent decade (to 
2010), but in absolute terms the numbers remain very high. The most 
recent data shows that (on the preferred official assessment for 
counting prisoners) on December 31, 2011, there were 1,598,970 
prisoners in U.S. state and federal prisons that were sentenced for a 
term of one year or more.14 The number of prisoners in state prisons 
 
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia, 87 (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/24B61FAA213E5470CA257B3C
000DCF8A/$File/45170_2012reissue.pdf. 
12 Ilyana Kuziemko & Steven D. Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug 
Offenders, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2043, 2044 (2004) (noting the dearth of literature concerning 
the impact of increased sentences for drug offences on crime and summarizing the findings 
of other research). 
13 Id. By 2005, this figure had increased to nearly 500,000. See DAVE BEWLEY-
TAYLOR ET AL., INCARCERATION OF DRUG OFFENDERS: COSTS AND IMPACTS 3 (2005), 
http://www.iprt.ie/files/incarceration_of_drug_users.pdf. 
14 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 10. The total number of incarcerated people was in 
fact 2,239,800 (i.e., 937 adults per 100,000 population); Lauren E. Glaze & Erika Parks, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau Of Justice Statistics, 
Correctional Populations In The United States, 2011 3 (Nov, 2012). This measure is 
termed the “custody [prison] population” and differs from the “jurisdiction [prisoner] 
population” (which is the official measure) in the following manner. The difference is 
obscure but is explained as follows: 
BJS’s official measure of the prison population is the count of prisoners under the 
jurisdiction or legal authority of state and federal adult correctional officials 
(1,598,780 in 2011). The jurisdiction population count is reported in Prisoners in  
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for drug offenses was 237,000 (17% of total state prisoners).15 In the 
ten years from 2000 to 2010 there was a reduction of 21,100 drug 
offenders in state prisons.16 However, the number of drug offenders in 
federal prisons increased by 29,800 during this period.17 Drug 
offenders comprise 48% of all offenders in federal prisons.18 The total 
number of drug offenders in federal prisons in 2011 was 94,600.19 
Thus, in the United States there are well over 300,000 offenders in 
prison for drug offenses.20 
The main reason for the increased incarceration rate of drug 
offenders in the United States is penalty escalation against the 
backdrop of mandatory sentencing laws and presumptive guidelines, 
which has been the trend of sentencing reform in the United States 
since the 1970s.21 
Most states in the United States as well as the federal jurisdiction 
have advisory or presumptive sentencing grid guidelines, which use 
 
2011, BJS website, NCJ 239808, December 2012. These prisoners may be held in 
prison or jail facilities located outside of the state or federal prison systems. The 
prison population reported in table 2 in this report is the number held in custody or 
physically housed in state (1,289,376 in 2011) and federal (214,774 in 2011) adult 
correctional facilities, regardless of which entity has legal authority over the 
prisoners (appendix table 1). This includes state and federal prisoners held in 
privately operated facilities. The difference between the number of prisoners in 
custody and the number under jurisdiction is the number of state and federal 
prisoners held in the custody of local jails, inmates out to court, and those in transit 
from the jurisdiction of legal authority to the custody of a confinement facility 
outside that jurisdiction. Because table 2 presents data on the number of individuals 
under the supervision of the adult correctional systems by correctional status, BJS 
uses the count of the number of prisoners held in custody to avoid double counting 
prisoners held in local jails. 
Id. at 2. 
15 Carson & Sabol, supra note 9. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 Id. (although there was a reduction from 2010 to 2011). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 For a discussion of the magnitude of the problem in Ohio, see Jelani Jefferson Exum, 
Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons: A Lesson from Ohio, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 881 (2011). A 
study of Kentucky appears in Robert G. Lawson, Drug Law Reform-Retreating from an 
Incarceration Addiction, 98 KY. L.J. 201 (2010). 
21 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 146 (1996). For an overview of 
sentencing reform in the United States, see William W. Wilkins Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & 
John R. Steer, A Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature, 
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305 (1993); Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of 
Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2006). Some states appear to be in the process of 
moderating penalties for some offences. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART 
REFORM IS POSSIBLE, States Reducing Incarceration Rates And Costs While Protecting 
Communities (Aug. 2011). 
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criminal history score22 and offense seriousness to calculate the 
appropriate penalty.23 None of these policies and practices emanated 
from a clear theoretical foundation, but rather stemmed from “back-of 
an-envelope calculations and collective intuitive judgments.”24 
The federal sentencing guidelines are especially harsh on drug 
offenders.25 The guidelines are no longer mandatory in nature, 
following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v 
Booker,26 however, sentences within guideline ranges are still 
imposed in approximately 60% of cases.27 
The penalties for drug offenders are contingent on an offender’s 
prior history and the nature of the offense in question. The “base 
offense level” (i.e., the level for offenders with no prior convictions or 
a prior history score of 1) for offenses involving the manufacture, 
importing, exporting, or trafficking (including possession to commit 
such offenses) involving 30 kilograms or more of heroin or 150 
kilograms or more of cocaine is level 38,28 which is a minimum of 
between 19.5 and 24.5 years imprisonment (235-293 months, to be 
precise).29 Even much smaller amounts of drugs are dealt with 
severely. If an offender commits an offense involving at least 700 
grams but less than 1 kilogram of heroin, at least 3.5 kilograms but 
less than 5 kilograms of cocaine, or at least 1,000 kilograms but less 
than 3,000 kilograms of Marihuana, the base level is 30,30 which is a 
minimum of 9 to 11.25 years.31 Even relatively small amounts of 
 
22 Which is based mainly on the number, seriousness and age of the prior conviction. 
23 Tonry, supra note 21, at 93. 
24 Id. 
25 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 GUIDELINES MANUAL 394 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/2012_Guidelines_Manual
_Full.pdf. 
26 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that aspects of the guidelines that were mandatory 
were contrary to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury); see also Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Irizarry v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); Alleyne v. 
United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) (holding that any fact that increases the penalty for 
an offence, including one where a mandatory penalty applies, is an element of the offence 
and hence must be established beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury). 
27 Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug 
Convictions, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1135, 1160 (2010). The offense levels range from 1 
(least serious) to 43 (most serious). The criminal history score ranges from 0 to 13 or more 
(worst offending record). 
28 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 25, at 394. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 141. 
31 Id. at 394. 
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drugs result in imprisonment. If an offender commits an offense 
involving at least 5 grams but less than 10 grams of heroin or at least 
25 grams but less than 50 grams of cocaine, the base level is 14,32 
which is a minimum of fifteen to twenty-one months.33 
By way of further example, a relatively well-known presumptive 
sentencing system is the grid system in Minnesota, which also utilizes 
offense severity and prior criminality as the defining penalty 
variables.34 The vertical axis of the grid lists the severity levels of 
offenses in descending order (there are ten different levels). The 
horizontal axis provides a (seven level) criminal history score, which 
reflects the offender’s criminal record.35 The presumptive sentence 
appears in the cell of the grid at the intersection of the offense score 
and the offender score. Where the sentence is one of imprisonment, a 
precise period is indicated, as is a range within which a court can 
sentence an offender without it being regarded as a departure.36 The 
range allows for the operation of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances other than those relating to an offender’s prior criminal 
history. Sentences may only be imposed outside the range where 
substantial and compelling circumstances exist.37 The guidelines are 
different to federal sentencing guidelines, but can operate just as 
severely. The presumptive penalty for a first-degree controlled 
substance crime (which can be committed by selling ten grams of 
cocaine or heroin or possessing 25 grams of cocaine or heroin)38 for 
an offender without a prior criminal history is 74-103 months 
 
32 Id. at 142. 
33 Id. at 394. 
34 MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID (2012), 
available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2012%2520Standard%2520Grid 
.pdf. For an explanation of the grid, see MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, 
MINNESOTA SENTENCING AND GUIDELINES COMMENTARY (2012) (hereinafter 
MINNESOTA SENTENCING AND GUIDELINES COMMENTARY), available at http://mn.gov 
/sentencing-guidelines/images/2012%2520Guidelines.pdf. In the United States, over a 
dozen other states also utilize sentencing grids. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing 
Guidelines in Minnesota and Other American States: A Progress Report, in THE POLITICS 
OF SENTENCING REFORM 169, 171 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
35 This is determined according to a criminal history score, with each felony carrying a 
predetermined number of points, with felonies more than fifteen years old being omitted. 
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 34, at comment 2.B. 
36 In which case the court must complete a departure report and submit it to the 
Sentencing Guideline Commission within fifteen days of the sentence. 
37 For a more detailed explanation of the Minnesota grid system, see Andrew von 
Hirsch, Proportionality and Parsimony in American Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Minnesota and Oregon Standards, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 149, 149 
(Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
38 Minn. Stat. § 152.021 (2012). 
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imprisonment.39 For a second-degree controlled substance crime 
(which can be committed by selling three grams of cocaine or heroin 
or possessing 6 grams of cocaine or heroin)40 for an offender without 
a prior criminal history the presumptive penalty is 41 to 57 months.41 
Some of the harshest types of mandatory sentencing laws are the 
three-strikes laws, which have been adopted in over twenty states.42 
The Californian three-strikes laws43, which were reformed in 2012,44 
are the most well known.45 Prior to the reforms, offenders convicted 
of any felony who had two or more relevant previous convictions 
were required to be sentenced to somewhere between twenty-five 
years to life imprisonment.46 The Californian three-strikes law was 
somewhat softened in 2012, such that a term of at least twenty-five 
years would only be required where the third offense was a serious or 
violent felony. In such cases, offenders continue to receive a 
significant premium—they must be sentenced to double the term they 
would have otherwise received for the instant offense.47 Thus, despite 
the softening of the laws, they still provide severe penalties for 
serious and violent offender third-strikers. These laws also continue to 
 
39 MINNESOTA SENTENCING AND GUIDELINES COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 73. 
40 Minn. Stat. § 152.022 (2012). 
41 MINNESOTA SENTENCING AND GUIDELINES COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 73. 
42 See Kate McMurry, Three-strikes Laws Providing More Show Than Go, TRIAL 12 
(1997); James Austin et al., The Impact of “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” 1 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (1999). 
43 Cal. Penal Code § 667(b)(i) (West 2012). 
44 Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Proposition 36, (see new Penal Code Section 
1170.126). 
45 It has been held that the laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution (the “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibition). See Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
46 This meant that some offenders were sentenced to grossly disproportionate 
sentences. Defendants have been sentenced to 25 years to life where their last offence was 
for a minor theft (which, prior to the three-strikes regime, would normally have resulted in 
a noncustodial sentence). For example, Jerry Dewayne Williams, a 27-year-old Californian 
was ordered to be imprisoned for 25 years to life without parole for stealing a slice of 
pepperoni pizza from a group of four youths, based on his previous convictions, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/life-for-pizza-theft-enrages-lawyers-1609876 
.html. Gary Ewing was sentenced to 25 years to life for stealing three golf clubs, each of 
which was worth US $399. Prior to that he had been convicted of four serious or violent 
felonies. (This sentence was appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of 
the legislation, Ewing v California 538 U.S. 11 (2003). For a discussion of the case, see 
Sara Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing v California: Three Strikes Laws and the Limits of the 
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review, CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (July 28, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650021). 
47 This is the manner in which offenders are dealt with generally for second strikes. 
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impose harsh penalties on drug offenders. This impact has been noted 
for well over a decade. In 2000, it was noted that while the law was 
principally aimed at sexual and violent offenders, after five years of 
operation, 19% of three-strikers had been deemed “simple drug 
offenders” and 31% of two-strike offenders (who are sentenced to 
three times the normal penalty) were drug offenders.48 By 2010, the 
number of three-strike offenders who had solely committed drug 
offenses was still around 19%, exceeding 1,000 offenders in total.49 
B. The Number of Drug Prisoners in Australia and the Sentencing 
of Drug Offenders 
Australia has not escaped the trend of increased incarceration of 
drug offenders. Currently, the rate of imprisonment is 168 per 
100,000 adult Australians. A decade earlier the rate was 148 per 
100,000. Thus, there has been an overall increase of 13% in the 
Australian imprisonment rate. The number of people imprisoned for 
drug matters has grown considerably more during this period—both 
in relative and absolute terms. As of June 30, 2002, the number of 
prisoners whose most serious offense was a drug matter was 2,014, of 
a total of 22,492 prisoners (i.e., 9%).50 Ten years later, this had grown 
to 3,408 prisoners of a total 29,383 prisoners (12%).51 
Thus, in the decade leading to June 30, 2012, in absolute terms, the 
number of offenders in prison for drug matters had increased by 1,396 
(an increase of 69%). In relative terms the portion of the entire prison 
population that was imprisoned for drug matters had increased by 
33%. 
The marked increase in drug offenders imprisoned in Australia 
stems from severe sentences for drug crimes. In Australia, most 
jurisdictions do not have presumptive penalties. The overarching 
methodology and conceptual approach that sentencing judges 
 
48 Gerald F. Uelmen, The Impact of Drugs Upon Sentencing Policy, 44 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 359, 362 (2000). 
49 Neil Barnes, Implications of New Study on Sentencing for Three Strikes Drug 
Offenders, NCJOLT (Sept. 7, 2012), http://ncjolt.org/implications-of-new-study-on              
-sentencing-for-three-strikes-drug-offenders. This included thirty-two offenders sentenced 
to life imprisonment for marijuana offences. Three Strikes Law, THE HILLS TREATMENT 
CENTER (last visited Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.thehillscenter.com/drug-rehab/three         
-strikes-law/. 
50 See Prisoners in Australia, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS–30 June 2012 (Feb 
20, 2003), http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/36AD2530CF827549 
CA256CD2008000E6/$File/45170_2002.pdf. 
51 Id. at 33. The figure is far higher in some other countries, e.g., Italy (29%); 
Luxembourg (42%); Spain (27%). Bewley-Taylor et al., supra note 13. 
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undertake in making sentencing decisions is termed the “instinctive 
synthesis.” The term originates from the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria decision of R. v Williscroft,52 where Judge 
Alexander Adam and Judge William Crockett stated, “Now, 
ultimately, every sentence imposed represents the sentencing judge’s 
instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in the punitive 
process.”53 
Thus, sentencing judges retain a broad discretion to impose a 
penalty anywhere from a nominal finding of guilty to the statutory 
maximum penalty and are not required to set out the weight given to 
various sentencing considerations.54 
Despite the largely discretionary nature of the sentencing 
methodology in Australia, penalties have increased because the 
maximum penalty for drug offenses is severe. All jurisdictions have 
penalties up to life imprisonment for offenders that deal with large 
quantities of drugs.55 And there are numerous cases, where in fact a 
life penalty has been imposed.56 
Further, while the instinctive synthesis is the orthodox approach to 
sentencing determinations, when it comes to serious drug cases, 
appeal courts in Australia have been quite prescriptive and detailed, 
even to the extent of setting out ranges that have been imposed for 
paradigm offense types. The most comprehensive analysis of a large 
number of serious drug cases is by McClellan C.J. at C.L. in DPP v 
De La Rosa,57 McClellan C.J. at C.L. The analysis was endorsed by 
 
52 R. v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 (Austl.). 
53 Id. at 300. The High Court of Australia has affirmed this approach in numerous 
decisions, for example see Wong v R. (2001) 76 ALJR 79 (Austl.), 94; Hili v The Queen; 
Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520 (Austl.). 
54 For criticism of this approach, see Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere, 
21 SYDNEY L. REV. 597, 605 (1999). 
55 The effective penalties for federal offences may increase further, see Consultation 
Paper issued by the Department of the Attorney General in June 2010. Submission to the 
Consultation on Implementation of Model Drug Schedules for Commonwealth Serious 
Drug Offences, ATODA (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.atoda.org.au/wp-content/uploads 
/ATODA-Submission-Consultation-on-implementation-of-model-drug-schedules-for         
-commonwealth-serious-drug-offences-170311-2.pdf. For a discussion, see generally Ian 
Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by Weight: Proposed Changes to the Commonwealth Code, 9.1 
Serious Drug Offences, 36 CRIM L.J. 265 (2012). 
56 See, e.g., R. v Chung [1999] NSWCCA 330 (Austl.); Barbaro v R. [2012] VSCA 288 
(Austl.). 
57 [2010] NSWCCA 194 (Austl.). 
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Maxwell P in Nguyen v The Queen; Phommalysack v The Queen,58 
who summarizes the observations of McClellan C.J. as follows: 
 
Import commercial quantity 
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 233B and Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth) s 307.1 
Range of sentences imposed 
Head sentence Non-parole period 
Group 1 
High quantity (tens or hundreds of 
kilograms); high value (tens of 
millions of dollars); large reward 
(hundreds of thousands of dollars) 
although finding of reward not 
required; not guilty plea in half of 
cases; no assistance; no remorse; 
mastermind, principal or part of 
organising committee; high degree 
of responsibility 
25y to life 8y 6m–30y 
Group 2 
High quantity; high value; guilty 
plea; principal, member of upper 
management or “essential” role 
with moderate to very high level of 
responsibility; reward in tens of 
thousands of dollars although 
finding of reward not indicative 
18–24y 6m 10–16y 
Group 3 
Quantity generally below 7 kg; 
mid-range role; discount for 
assistance, cooperation; plea not 
indicative 
8–15y 4–11y 
Group 4 
No prior convictions; good 
antecedents; quantity not 
indicative; plea not indicative 
although discount provided for 
early plea; role not indicative 
although generally part of 
syndicate 
6y 3m–8y 3–4y 6m 
The above chart represents a judicial assessment of a large sample 
of surveyed cases.59 The statistical data that exists is more wide-
ranging and generally indicates softer penalties, presumably because 
the quantity of many of the drugs was on average lower. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission Report 103, Same Crime, Same 
Time: The Sentencing of Federal Offenders (2006) looked at 
sentences across Australia involving a commercial quantity of 
 
58 [2011] VSCA 32 (Austl.). 
59 It has been noted that this summary needs to be applied in a flexible manner. In 
Trajkovski v The Queen (2011) 211 A Crim R 118 (Austl.), the Court disapproved of the 
use of the chart in a prescriptive manner. The Court held that this is to adopt a two stage 
sentencing process. 
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MDMA during the five year period 2000–2004.60 The report looked at 
sixty-three matters that involved a single charge. The jurisdictions 
where most cases occurred were New South Wales, Western Australia 
and Victoria. Overall the mean terms (maximum and minimum 
respectively) were 11.3 years and 5.5 years. For a commercial 
quantity of heroin, by comparison, the overall means were 27.75 
years and 11 years. 
These figures needed to be used with caution. In 2008, the High 
Court of Australia ruled that there is no difference in drug seriousness 
for sentencing purposes.61 Thus, the disparity between sentences for 
MDMA and heroin is no longer justified. 
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales also sets out data 
for the offense of supplying a large commercial quantity of a 
prohibited drug, which has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment 
and a standard non-parole period of 15 years. The data is for offenses 
between 2003 and 2007. There were seventy-four such offenses.62 
The guilty plea rate was 85%.63 The imprisonment rate was 98%—
this is the same whether the offender pleaded guilty or not guilty. The 
median sentence for offenders pleading guilty was 7 years and 7.5 
months with the median non-parole period being 4 years and 9 
months.64 
The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council provides data for 
sentences for trafficking in a large commercial quantity of drugs (the 
maximum penalty for this offense is life imprisonment). The first 
report is for all offenses committed between 2004–05 to 2008–09. 
During this period there were seventy offenders and the 90% of these 
received a term of imprisonment. The terms of imprisonment range 
from one year to sixteen years. The median term was six years and six 
months and the most common prison term was six years.65 The most 
 
60 Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, AUSTRALIAN LAW 
REFORM COMM’N (2006), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports 
/103/. 
61 Adams v The Queen (2008) 234 CLR 143 (Austl.). 
62 PATRIZIA POLETTI & HUGH DONNELLY, THE IMPACT OF THE STANDARD NON-
PAROLE PERIOD SENTENCING SCHEMES ON SENTENCING PATTERNS IN NEW SOUTH 
WALES, 51 (Judicial Commission of New South Wales 2010). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Sentencing Snapshot, VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL (June 2010), 
https://sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/files/snapshot_102
_sentencing_trends_for_trafficking_in_a_large_commercial_quantity_of_drugs_in_the 
_higher_courts_of_victoria__june_2010.pdf. 
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recent survey by Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council was for the 
period 2006-2007 to 2010-2011. This shows a hardening of penalties. 
During this period the number of sentenced offenders for trafficking 
in a large commercial quantity of drugs rose from seventy to eighty-
nine and the imprisonment rate rose to 96%. The median term was 
imprisonment for seven years and the most common length of 
imprisonment was eight years to less than nine years.66 
The reason for the severe sentences imposed on drug offenders is 
not simply a manifestation of the high maximum penalty for the 
offense. It stems from the strict approach the courts have taken to 
sentencing such offenders and, in particular, that harsh penalties are 
needed to deter drug offenses and that drugs cause a large degree of 
harm in the community. This leaves little room for the operation of 
personal mitigating factors.67 
In R v Nguyen; R v Pham the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal usefully set out the principles that apply in sentencing serious 
federal drug offenders. The Court stated: 
The following general propositions emerge from the authorities: 
(a) the criminality of an offender must be assessed by 
consideration of the involvement of the offender in the steps 
taken to effect the importation: R v Lee at [27]; . . . 
(c) it is the criminality involved in the importation that must 
be identified—the fact that another person may be 
characterized as the “mastermind” does not mean that a person 
who was responsible for managing the importation into 
Australia is properly described as having only a middle level of 
responsibility . . . 
(d) although the weight of the drug imported is not the 
principal factor to be considered when fixing sentence, the size 
of the importation is a relevant factor and has increased 
significance when the offender is aware of the amount of drugs 
imported . . . 
(g) the difficulty of detecting importation offenses, and the 
great social consequences that follow, suggest that deterrence is 
 
66 Id. 
67 General deterrence does not totally overwhelm all other considerations. In Sukkar v R 
[No 2] (2008) 178 A Crim R 433 (Austl.), the Court stated at [21]: “It is established that 
the major sentencing considerations for offences of trafficking in dangerous drugs of 
addiction, including cocaine, are general and personal deterrence.” See Bellissimo (1996) 
84 A Crim R 465, 471 (Austl.). Although the weight of the illicit drug is not, generally, the 
chief factor to be taken into account in fixing a sentence, it is, plainly, a matter of 
importance. Other matters to be taken into account include the offender’s knowledge of 
the type and quantity of the drug in question, and the nature and level of the offender’s 
participation in its trafficking. See also Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 
CLR 584 [67] - [70] (Austl.). 
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to be given chief weight on sentence and that stern punishment 
will be warranted in almost every case . . . 
(h) the sentence to be imposed for a drug importation offense 
must signal to would-be drug traffickers that the potential 
financial rewards to be gained from such activities are 
neutralized by the risk of severe punishment . . . 
(j) the prior good character of a person involved in a drug 
importation offense is generally to be given less weight as a 
mitigating factor on sentence . . .68 
Specific deterrence is also regarded as an important consideration in 
relation to offenders who have prior convictions for drug offenses.69 
The seriousness of the harm that courts regard drug offending as is 
illustrated in Mokbel v The Queen70 where the court stated: 
The sentences imposed had to be seen to reflect the community’s 
abhorrence of trafficking in drugs, and the Court’s denunciation of a 
person who, for reasons of sheer greed, was prepared—repeatedly 
and determinedly—to inflict untold harm on the community.71 
In summary, the key principles that guide sentencing courts in 
Australia in sentencing drug offenders are as follows: 
1. General deterrence is the most important consideration. 
2. It is rare for offenders who are found guilty of large-scale drug 
offenses to not receive a custodial term. 
3. In terms of offense severity, the most important consideration is 
the offender’s role. 
4. The second most important consideration is the amount of drugs. 
5. The Courts do not distinguish between degrees of dangerousness 
of drugs. 
6. There is scope for mitigating factors to reduce the sentence. 
7. The most important mitigating factors are: 
  assistance to authorities; 
  low purity of drugs; 
  drug addiction; 
  no commerciality; and 
  previous good character.72 
 
68 [2010] NSWCCA 238 (Austl.). 
69 See Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 (Austl.). 
70 [2013] VSCA 118 (Austl.). 
71 Id. at 108. 
72 See MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING (2011). 
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The culmination of these considerations in addition to the high 
maximum penalties for drug offenses has resulted in a significant 
increase in drug offender prison numbers in Australia. 
II 
THE MOVE TO DECRIMINALIZE ILLICIT DRUGS 
In this part of the paper, we examine the evidence regarding the 
actual impact of drug use. This is important because it is suggested 
that one of the main reasons underlying the imposition of harsh 
penalties for serious drug offenders is the correlative link made 
between drug trafficking and the negative effects that drugs have on 
users, and the wider community in the form of increased crime. This 
suggestion is challenged when consideration is given to the arguments 
supporting the decriminalization of drug use. If using drugs does not 
constitute a crime, the correlation between drug trafficking and 
serious crime is less obvious. Hence, if there is a softening of the law 
relating to drug use there needs to be a parallel and corresponding 
reduction in the penalties for drug supplying. 
The decriminalization of drugs involves the reduction or removal 
of preexisting controls and penalties. This is generally achieved by 
replacing prison terms with other non-incarceration penalties such as 
fines or recording the incident without imposing a permanent criminal 
record. A core aspect of the decriminalization of drugs involves a 
shift towards harm reduction via the imposition of noncriminal 
sanctions.73 
In some respects, drug decriminalization represents an intermediate 
balance between drug prohibition and drug legalization. It has been 
criticized as amounting to “the worst of both worlds” because whilst 
personal drug usage may no longer attract a criminal sentence, drug 
sales remain illegal, thereby perpetuating one of the core concerns 
connected with drug offenses that relates to the fact that the 
production and distribution of drugs continues to constitute an activity 
undertaken by the criminal underworld. 
It has also been argued that decriminalization fails to discourage 
illegal drug use as it removes the criminal penalties that might 
otherwise cause some people to avoid drug usage. Whilst these are 
cogent arguments, it is also clear that the decriminalization of 
offenses relating to drug possession allows the law enforcement 
 
73 GLEN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR 
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES 6 (Cato Inst. 2009). 
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system of a country to put more effort into the process of arresting 
dealers and big time criminals, instead of apprehending minor 
offenders for possessory offenses. 
The move to decriminalize drugs is gaining global momentum. In 
2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy called for an end to the 
criminalization of drug use and noted that despite the vast expenditure 
on the criminalization and repressive measures directed at producers, 
traffickers and consumers of illegal drugs, it has clearly failed “to 
effectively curtail supply or consumption.”74 
In subsequent reports in both 2012 and 2013 this message was 
reinforced.75 In the 2013 report, the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy called for an end to the criminalization of drug use because of 
the enormous impact the criminalization of drugs has had in the 
spread of the hepatitis C infection.76 It is estimated that of the 16 
million people who inject drugs around the world, 10 million are now 
living with Hepatitis C.77 The latest report from the Global 
Commission on Drug Policy has condemned the drug war as a failure 
and recommended immediate and significant reforms of global drug 
prohibition. 
During this period, it has been estimated that around twenty-five to 
thirty countries across the world have implemented some form of 
drug decriminalization, ranging from the decriminalization of drugs 
for personal use in Croatia from the start of 2013, to the creation of 
syringe exchange programs in many Middle Eastern and African 
countries including Egypt, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates.78 
A diverse range of approaches have been implemented with respect 
to the possession of cannabis. For example, in 2003 Belgium passed 
laws distinguishing between the possession of cannabis for personal 
use and other types of drug offenses. The laws were subsequently 
amended and the Minister of Justice and Prosecutors-General issued a 
directive in 2005, instructing that adult individuals found with under 
 
74 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS AND HIV/AIDS: HOW THE 
CRIMINILIZATION OF DRUG USE FUELS THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC 2 (2012) [hereinafter 
WAR ON DRUGS]. 
75 Id. See also GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF 
THE WAR ON DRUGS ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE HIDDEN HEPATITIS C EPIDEMIC (2013) 
[hereinafter THE NEGATIVE IMPACT]. 
76 THE NEGATIVE IMPACT, supra note 75, at 3. 
77 Id. 
78 See AIR ROSMARIN & NIAMH EASTWOOD, A QUIET REVOLUTION: DRUG 
DECRIMINALISATION POLICIES IN PRACTICE ACROSS THE GLOBE’ DRUGS (Release 2011). 
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three grams of cannabis for personal use would be issued a “Process-
Verbal Simplifé” (PVS) or “simple record.” The issuance of a PVS 
does not attract a penalty and the cannabis is not confiscated.  The 
purpose of the PVS is merely to record the circumstances of the 
possession and for a copy to be kept at the local police station.79 
Portugal is one of the most groundbreaking countries in terms of 
the breadth and scope of its approach to drug decriminalization. Drug 
use and possession were decriminalized in Portugal in 2001 in 
response to what the Portugal government perceived as a nationwide 
and uncontrollable drug problem, exacerbated by a criminalization 
regime that was effectively draining all of the financial and human 
resources of the country.80 Decriminalization in Portugal was enacted 
following the issuance of an expert study by the Commission for a 
National Drug Strategy that recommended a drug strategy premised 
around the core principles of “harm reduction, prevention and 
reintegration of the drug user into society.”81 The Commission 
concluded that decriminalization was the most advantageous strategy 
to fight the growing drug problem in Portugal. Significantly, the 
ultimate objective of the strategy recommended by the Commission 
was to reduce drug usage and abuse.82 
The strategy eventually implemented in Portugal relied heavily 
upon the recommendations outlined by the commission. Decree Law 
30/2000 was enacted in October 2000 and took effect on July 1, 2001. 
The new law decriminalizes the use and possession of drugs and 
makes it clear that the commission of these acts only constitutes an 
administrative offense, provided the possession or consumption does 
not exceed up to ten days’ worth of an average daily dose of drugs, 
which are intended only for personal use. An individual found in 
possession of drugs will only be referred to a criminal court where 
they are in possession of more than ten days’ worth of personal 
supply. No distinction is made in this law between different forms of 
 
79 Country Overview: Belgium, EMCDDA (May 28, 2013), http://www.emcdda.europa 
.eu/publications/country-overviews/be. 
80 GREENWALD, supra note 73. 
81 PORTUGUESE DRUG STRATEGY, 82 (1998) [hereinafter PORTUGUESE DRUG 
STRATEGY]. COMMISSÂO PARA A ESTRATÊGIE NACIONAL DE COMBATE Â DROGA 
COMISSION FOR A NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY, [NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE FIGHT 
AGAINST DRUGS] 82 (1998) (Port.). 
82 Id. at 6–7. 
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hard or soft drugs, nor is a distinction made between private 
consumption and public consumption.83 
A police officer may issue an individual a citation to attend 
Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction, “CDTs”, which 
are not a component of the criminal justice system. The police will 
generally refer a user to a CDT within seventy-two hours of the 
offense being committed, however no arrest is made.84 The CDT 
panel is comprised of three government appointed civilians. One of 
the members must be a legal expert but the other two are appointed by 
the Ministry of Health and may come from medical, psychology or 
social services backgrounds. The panel is non-adversarial and the 
focus of the discussion is upon the health of the individual in issue 
and whether treatment is required.85 Participants are not legally 
represented to further emphasize the noncriminal nature of the 
proceedings.86 
A broad range of different sanctions may be issued by a CDT. For 
addicts, these include prohibitions on dealing with particular people, 
expulsion from particular venues, restrictions on foreign travel and 
ineligibility for the practice of particular occupations. Similar 
penalties may be applied to non-addicts although a CDT may decide 
to simply issue a warning if it is clear, from the circumstances and the 
nature of the substance that the non-addict will abstain from future 
use.87 
The impact of the decriminalization laws in Portugal has been 
widely debated, with some commentators suggesting that it has been 
enormously successful in reducing the impact of drug crime, despite 
the fact that it has resulted, in overall terms, in an increase in drug 
consumption.88 Given, however, that the focus of the initiatives were 
 
83 See Kellen Russoniello, The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details: Portugal’s Focus on 
Public Health as a Model for Decriminalization of Drugs in Mexico, 12 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 371, 385 (2012). 
84 INEKE VAN BEUSEKOM ET AL., RAND EUROPE, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING 
AND EVALUATING THE PORTUGUESE DRUG STRATEGY 7 (2002). 
85 Id. at 15. See, e.g., Belgium Country Profile, Lisbon, EUROPEAN MONITORING 
CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, 2011, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu 
/htmlCFM/indexs174 en.htm. (last updated June 24, 2014). 
86 For a discussion on the options of introducing this type of process in the United 
States, see Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving 
from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 327 (2010). 
87 Russoniello, supra note 83 at 388; see also GREENWALD supra note 73, at 3. 
88 See A. Stevens & C.E. Hughes, A Resounding Success of a Disastrous Failure: Re-
Examining the Interpretation of Evidence on the Portuguese Decriminalisation of Illicit 
Drugs, DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 101, 104 (2012). 
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to prevent the exacerbation of the problems stemming from 
decriminalization, it seems clear that these objectives have been 
successful.89 Studies by the CATO Institute have revealed that whilst 
drug addiction and other associated pathologies have increased in 
most EU states, these problems have been either contained or 
significantly improved within Portugal since 2001.90  Significantly, 
problem drug use, and by this we refer to long-term use or the 
injection of opioids, cocaine or amphetamines, is now far lower in 
Portugal than in other countries.91 
Other countries have followed the example of Portugal. For 
example, Mexico introduced decriminalization laws in 2009 
following enormous difficulties the country experienced with drug 
use and abuse.92 The main objective of the decriminalization laws in 
Mexico, however, was to avoid counter narcotic officials from having 
to focus upon the activities of small time drug offenders.93 
Many States adopting a decriminalization approach have, however, 
sought to balance their stance by significantly increasing the 
sentences of those who commit corresponding drug offenses beyond 
the threshold quantities or parameters of the decriminalized 
circumstances.94 This represents an interesting trend, although its 
schematic focus lacks balance and proportion. As noted below, 
proportionality is crucial to the underlying sentencing objectives for 
drug offenses. It is unreasonable and disproportionate to impose a 
reactive sentencing framework. Such an approach ignores the 
consequential assumption underlying decriminalization, that drug 
 
89 See Brian Vastag, 5 Years After: Portugal’s Drug Decriminalization Policy Shows 
Positive Results, SCI. AM. (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm 
?id=portugal-drug-decriminalization. 
90 GREENWALD, supra note 73, at 28. 
91 See LOUISA DEGENHARDT ET AL., THE BECKLEY FOUND. DRUG POLICY 
PROGRAMME: COMPARING THE DRUG SITUATION ACROSS COUNTRIES: PROBLEMS, 
PITFALLS AND POSSIBILITIES 4, 3 (2009). 
92 See David Luhnow & Jose de Cordoba, Mexico Eases Ban on Drug Possession, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 
125086054771949269. See also Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United 
States, 91 OR. L. REV. 1301, 1318 (quoting UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND 
CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 168 (2009), “decriminalizing drug use falls within the 
Convention parameters because ‘drug possession is still prohibited but the sanctions fall 
under the administrative law not the criminal law.’”). 
93 Luhnow & Cordoba, supra note 92. The authors refer to Mexican authorities who 
have justified the laws on the basis that it is a positive move as it “helps the government 
focus on the bad guys and lets state and local governments get involved in drug abuse as a 
public health issue.” Id. 
94 ROSMARIN & EASTWOOD, supra note 78, at 40. 
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offenses derived from or associated with decriminalized drug 
offenses, including drug trafficking, will no longer have the same 
criminal impact and do not generate the same marginalization and 
stigmatization that might previously have been the case. 
Given the above trends and effects, a sound argument can be made 
that decriminalization policies should not be implemented in a 
vacuum. Interconnected drug offenses are necessarily impacted by a 
decriminalization policy because they are connected to an overall 
strategy of reductive criminalization. The imposition of non-
incarceration penalties for small, personal-usage drug possession 
offenses should result in a corresponding decrease in drug-trafficking 
offenses because the two are inextricably connected. The 
decriminalization process should not be regarded as a discrete and 
isolated process that targets specific offenses. Arguably, the 
underlying objectives of the process are best achieved in the context 
of comprehensive and interconnected decriminalization and 
sentencing reduction initiatives. 
III 
THE EFFICACY OF PUNISHMENT TO DETER DRUG OFFENDERS AND 
PROTECT THE COMMUNITY FROM THEM 
In this part of the Article we move from arguments relating to the 
decriminalizing of drug use and the effect of this to the efficacy of 
one of the main current means used to reduce the drug trade. As noted 
above, the sharp end of enforcement is imposing sanctions on drug 
offenders. As we have seen, offenders who distribute or make drugs 
are generally subjected to harsh penalties. 
There have been few studies that have focused on the specific issue 
of whether sentencing can reduce the amount of drugs in the 
community. However, many studies have been undertaken on the 
efficacy of sentencing to achieve common sentencing objectives. 
These objectives aim to reduce crime in general. We examine these 
general studies and also the more specific ones that have been 
undertaken in relation to drug offenses. 
There are three rationales that are typically provided for harsh 
criminal penalties. Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by 
punishing individual offenders for their transgressions and, thereby, 
convincing them that crime does not pay. In effect, it attempts to 
dissuade offenders from re-offending by inflicting an unpleasant 
experience on them (normally imprisonment) that they will seek to 
avoid in the future. General deterrence seeks to dissuade potential 
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offenders with the threat of anticipated punishment from committing 
similar offenses by illustrating the harsh consequences of offending. 
Incapacitation aims to prevent crime by placing offenders in prison 
and segregating them from the rest of the community. 
A. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work 
The available data suggest that specific deterrence does not work. 
Inflicting harsh sanctions on individuals does not make them less 
likely to reoffend in the future. The level of certainty of this 
conclusion is very high—so high that it has been suggested that 
specific deterrence should be abolished as a sentencing 
consideration.95 
There have been numerous studies across a wide range of 
jurisdictions and different time periods that come to this conclusion.96 
Daniel Nagin, F.T. Cullen, and C.L. Johnson97 provide the most 
recent extensive literature review regarding specific deterrence.98 
They reviewed separately the impact of custodial sanctions versus 
noncustodial sanctions and the effect of the length of sentence on 
reoffending. The review examined six experimental studies where 
custodial versus noncustodial sentences were randomly assigned;99 
eleven studies involved matched pairs;100 thirty-one studies were 
regression-based101 and seven other studies did not neatly fit into any 
of those three categories, and included naturally occurring social 
experiments that allowed inferences to be drawn regarding the 
capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders. 
The last category included a study based on clemency granted to 
over 20,000 prisoners in Italy in 2006. A condition of release was that 
if those who were released re-offended within five years, they would 
be required to serve the remaining (residual) sentence plus the 
sentence for the new offense. It was noted that there was a 1.24% 
 
95 See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The capacity of criminal sanctions to shape 
the behaviour of offenders: specific deterrence doesn’t work, rehabilitation might and the 
implications for sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012). 
96 Id. 
97 Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl L. Johnson, Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 145 (2009). 
98 The main studies are summarized in Don Weatherburn et al., The specific deterrent 
effect of custodial penalties on juvenile reoffending, CRIME AND JUST. BULLETIN No.132 
(2009) and in the VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOES IMPRISONMENT 
DETER? A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (2011). 
99 Nagin, supra note 97, at 144–45. 
100 Id. at 145–54. 
101 Id. at 154–55. 
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reduction in re-offending for each month of the residual sentence. 
This observation can be explained on the basis that the threat of future 
imprisonment discouraged imprisonment. However, it was also noted 
that offenders who had served longer sentences prior to being released 
had higher rates of re-offending, supporting the view that longer 
prison terms reduce the capacity for future imprisonment to shape 
behavior.102 
Nagin et al. conclude that offenders who are sentenced to 
imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than those who 
are not. In fact, some studies show that the rate of recidivism is 
higher. They conclude that: 
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies 
point more toward a criminogenic rather than preventive effect of 
custodial sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is 
weak because it is based on only a small number of studies, and 
many of the point estimates are not statistically significant.103 
The review suggests that not only do longer jail terms not deter, but 
neither do tougher jail conditions. Studies also show that offenders 
who are sentenced to maximum-security prisons as opposed to 
minimum-security conditions do not re-offend less.104 
A more recent study by the Victorian Sentencing Advisory 
Council, which compared similarly placed offenders who had been 
sentenced to imprisonment with those who had not been imprisoned, 
found that those who were not sentenced to imprisonment had a lower 
recidivism rate.105 
Few specific deterrence studies have focused on drug offenders in 
particular. However, one recent study by Donald Green and Daniel 
Winik106 observed the re-offending of 1003 offenders who were 
initially sentenced for drug-related offenses between June 2002 and 
May 2003, by a number of different judges whose sentencing 
approaches varied significantly (some were described as “punitive,” 
 
102 Id. at 155. 
103 Id. at 145. See also VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, REOFFENDING 
FOLLOWING SENTENCING IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF VICTORIA (2013), available 
at http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/content/publications/reoffending-following     
-sentencing-magistrates-court-victoria. 
104 Nagin, supra note 97, at 124. 
105 VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 98. 
106 Donald Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the 
Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism among Drug Offenders, 
CRIMINOLOGY (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477673. 
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others as “lenient”), resulting in differing terms of imprisonment and 
probation. The study concluded that neither the length of 
imprisonment nor probation had an effect on the rate of re-offending 
during the four-year follow-up period. 
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that 
subjecting offenders (including drug offenders) to harsh punishment 
is unlikely to increase the prospect that they will become law-abiding 
citizens in the future. There is no evidence to support the argument 
that imposing increasingly severe hardship on recidivists will increase 
the likelihood that they will become law-abiding citizens. 
B. General Deterrence (Also) Does Not Work 
The main form of deterrence that is used to justify the harsher 
penalties is general deterrence, not specific deterrence. The data 
regarding general deterrence, however, reveals a similar picture. 
There are two forms of general deterrence. Marginal general 
deterrence concerns the correlation between the severity of the 
sanction and the prevalence of an offense. Absolute general 
deterrence concerns the threshold question of whether there is any 
connection between criminal sanctions, of whatever nature, and the 
incidence of criminal conduct.107 
It seems that marginal deterrence does not work and absolute 
general deterrence does work. The findings regarding general 
deterrence are relatively settled.108 
The failure of even the death penalty to act as a marginal deterrent 
is exemplified by the experience in New Zealand. During the period 
of 1924 to 1962 there were periods when the death penalty (for 
murder) was in force, then abolished, then revived, and abolished 
again. The changes generally followed some level of public debate 
and were well publicized. Although the murder rates fluctuated during 
this period, they bore no correlation to the prevailing penalty, whether 
capital punishment or life imprisonment.109 
Similar findings have emerged in the United States.110 The absence 
of a link between lower homicide rates and the death penalty in the 
 
107 FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRANCE, THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973). 
108 For an overview of the literature, see supra note 98. 
109 See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60–61, 191 (1969); see 
also Roger Hood, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 211–12 (1996). 
110 See, e.g., John Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment 
of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994). 
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United States has, however, been challenged by some 
commentators.111 However, the evidence used in support of a 
connection between the lower homicide rates on which it is based are 
statistically significant and the evidence goes against the 
overwhelming homicide rates, and capital punishment has been 
debunked on the basis that the data upon trend of the data. As has 
been pointed out by Richard Berk,112 the main findings in support of 
the hypothesis that capital punishment is a deterrent are based on 
eleven findings113 out of a sample size of 1,000 observations114 where 
the homicide rate dropped in a U.S. state following an execution in 
the previous year. The data are statistically meaningless and contrary 
to the trend of 99% of the observations. Beck states: 
Whatever one makes of those 11 observations, it would be bad 
statistics and bad social policy to generalize from the 11 
observations to the remaining 989. So, for the vast majority of states 
for the vast majority of years, there is no evidence for deterrence in 
these analyses. Even for the remaining 11 observations, credible 
evidence for deterrence is lacking.115 
Berk concludes that what clearly emerges from the literature is 
“that for the vast majority of states in the vast majority of years, there 
is no evidence of a negative relationship between executions and 
homicides.”116 
The strongest evidence in support of the theory of marginal general 
deterrence stems from the considerable drop in serious crime levels in 
the United States over the past thirty years. As noted in the discussion 
below, the drop coincided with a significant increase in the 
 
111 See, e.g., Dale Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Executions and Deterrence: A 
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 35 J. APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001); Paul Zimmerman, 
State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 
(2004). 
112 See Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu 
All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303 (2005). 
113 Situations in which five or more executions occurred in a state in a single year. Id. 
114 Each “observation” is the homicide rate in a U.S. state over the period of one year. 
Id. 
115 Berk, supra note 112, at 328. 
116 Id.; see D. Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis of 
Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POLICY RES. 201–24 (2009); see also J. Donohue, Assessing 
the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change over the Previous Decades 
and the Benefits on the Margin, DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER (Steven Raphael & Michael 
A. Stoll eds., 2009); A.N. Doob & C.M. Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting 
the Null Hypothesis, 13 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003). 
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imprisonment rate. The rate of violent crime in the United States 
dropped by more than 60% from 1990 to 2009.117 
These figures, at face value, suggest that imprisoning ever greater 
numbers of offenders effectively reduces the crime rate. A number of 
detailed studies have been undertaken to examine and explain this 
causal connection. One analyst, William Spelman, has stated that up 
to 21% of crime reduction is attributable to the increased rate of 
imprisonment.118 However, it is not clear whether this reduction is 
attributable to the incapacitation of offenders (who are thereby 
prevented from committing crimes whilst they are imprisoned) or to 
the effects of marginal deterrence.119 Removing more than one million 
offenders from the community obviously makes it impossible for 
them to participate in crime and hence adds to the crime statistics 
during their period of incarceration.120 
Further, it has been noted that similar crime reduction trends 
occurred in the United States’ nearest neighbor, Canada, over 
approximately the same period. During that period, the imprisonment 
rate in Canada actually fell.121 
Empirical evidence not only questions the causal link between 
higher penalties and lower crime, but also provides strong evidence of 
alternative explanations for falling crime rates. For example, it has 
been argued that 50% of the fall in the United States crime rate is the 
result of an increased number of women from disadvantaged groups 
(teenagers, the poor, and minority groups) whose children would have 
been most likely to commit crimes as adults, being able to abort 
unwanted pregnancies after legalization in the 1970s. This ostensibly 
incredible finding is supported by the fact that states with higher 
abortion rates in the 1970s had higher drops in crime in the 1990s; 
 
117 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables 
/viortrdtab.cfm (The rate of decline in other forms of crime was similar. This is discussed 
further below in the context of the discussion on general incapacitation.). 
118 William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment 
and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419, 485, (2000); see also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL 
WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (2000); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why 
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J. ECON. PERSPS. 163, 178 (2004). 
119 On balance, studies show that a 10% increase in imprisonment rates produce a 2-4% 
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K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based 
Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009) and 
the references cited therein. 
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121 Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 803 (2010). 
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with each 10% rise in abortions corresponding to a 1% drop in crimes 
two decades later.122 
Recent research from Germany is consistent with U.S. findings 
regarding the failure of marginal general deterrence.123 At the Goethe 
University Frankfurt, Horst Entorf reviewed twenty-four years of 
criminal sentencing practices in West German states for correlates to 
the crime rate. Entorf sought to examine the effect of each stage of the 
prosecution process, from investigation to conviction, on the 
commission rates of two specific crimes (“major property” and 
“violent crimes”), in order to assess their relative contribution to the 
overall effect of the criminal prosecution process on crime rates. The 
results were analyzed by the theoretical econometric analysis 
methodology, which considered the deterrent effects of formal and 
informal, as well as custodial and noncustodial, sanctions.124 
It was discovered that a deterrent effect was found at “the first two 
stages of the criminal prosecution process” (charge and conviction) 
rather than at the “less robust” severity of punishment stage 
(sentencing). Entorf also found that: 
Results presented in [the] article suggest that crime is particularly 
deterred by the certainty of conviction. Here, contrary to popular 
belief, neither police nor judges but public prosecutors play the 
leading role. Extending severity of sentences, however, does not 
seem to provide a suitable strategy for fighting crime. In particular, 
the length of the imprisonment terms proves insignificant (emphasis 
added).125 
By contrast, the evidence relating to absolute general deterrence is 
more positive. The strongest empirical evidence in support of absolute 
deterrence comes from the United States, which (as noted above) over 
the past two decades has seen a marked increase in police numbers 
and a sharp decrease in crime.126 The near universal trend of data, 
 
122 M. Ellison, US Study Ties Crime Fall to Abortions, THE AGE 11, Aug. 1999, p. 13. 
See also Levitt, supra note 118, at 182–83. 
123 Horst Entorf, Goethe University Frankfurt, Crime, Prosecutors and the Certainty of 
Conviction, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO 5670 (2011). For a recent study supporting the 
inability of sanctions to deter domestic violence, see FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., DETERRING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: DO CRIMINAL SANCTIONS REDUCE REPEAT OFFENSES? (2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213310. 
124 Theoretical econometrics studies statistical properties of econometric procedures. 
Such properties include power of hypothesis tests and the efficiency of survey-sampling 
methods, of experimental designs, and of estimators. See PINDYCK ET AL., ECONOMETRIC 
METHODS AND ECONOMIC FORCASTS (4th ed. 1998). 
125 See Entorf, supra note 123, at 4. 
126 See Levitt, supra note 118, at 177 (estimating about a 14% increase). 
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which have outlined this link, supports the view that more police, and 
hence the greater actual and perceived likelihood of detection, has 
contributed to the reduction in crime.127 
The connection is complex due to the multifaceted nature of the 
changes that occurred during this period, which may also have had an 
effect on the crime rate. The changes include such things as better 
police methods, a generally improving economy, and other variables 
including abortion trends and the greater use of imprisonment. It has 
been noted that the greatest reduction in crime numbers occurs where 
police are highly visible. 
This accords with the ostensible success of “zero tolerance”128 
policing in locations such as New York City, which saw the greatest 
number of extra police employed and the sharpest decline in crime.129 
This trend was evident well over a decade ago. In a period of only 
several years following the introduction of zero tolerance policing, the 
rates of violent and property crime fell by approximately 35%.130 
After evaluating the large number of surveys analyzing the 
connection between more police and the crime rate, Raymond 
Paternoster concludes: 
What we are left with, then, is that clearly police presence deters 
crime, but it is probably very difficult to say with any degree of 
precision how much it deters. Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a 
 
127 See John Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent 
Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in BLUMSTEIN & WALLMAN, supra note 118. 
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129 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007). 
130 Peter Grabosky, Zero Tolerance Policing, 102 AUST. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY: 
TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 2 (1999). Grabosky notes that 
zero tolerance policing is not solely responsible for the drop in crime. He suggests that 
there are numerous contributing factors, including sustained economic growth; a reduction 
in the use of crack cocaine; the aging of the baby-boomer generation beyond the crime-
prone years; restricting the access of teenagers to firearms; and longer sentences for 
violent criminals. See also Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of 
the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1998); Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline 
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reasonable guess, that increasing the size of the police force by 10% 
will reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.131 
The link between lower crime rates and higher perceptions of being 
caught supports the theory of absolute deterrence, because the reason 
why the likelihood of being detected acts as a retardant to crime is the 
underlying assumption that if caught some hardship awaits. If rather 
than punishing offenders, police handed out lollies or movie tickets, 
more police would result in more crime. 
Thus, general deterrence does work, at least to the extent that if 
there was no real threat of punishment for engaging in unlawful 
conduct, the crime rate would soar. It follows that the threat of 
punishment discourages potential offenders from committing crime. 
This justifies the punishment of wrongdoers. The evidence does not 
support the view, however, that this relationship operates in a linear 
fashion, that is, the deterrent effect of sanctions does not increase in 
direct proportion to the severity of sanctions. 
Accordingly, while the objective of deterrence justifies imposing 
punishment, it is at best a remote consideration when it comes down 
to the question of how much punishment should be imposed. 
Absolute general deterrence provides a justification for imposing 
punishment but it does not justify the imposition of penalties that 
exceed the objective gravity of the offense. It follows that the pursuit 
of general deterrence cannot justify the imposition of harsh penalties 
for offenders. 
The conclusions above relate to crime in general. They are not 
specific to drug offending. There have been few studies, which focus 
on drug offending in specific. A recent report that examined the effect 
of harsh penalties for cross-border drug mules (from Mexico to the 
United States) noted that such penalties only had a small deterrent 
effect and that in fact the deterrent effect diminishes with sentence 
length.132 The authors suggest that increasing penalties does result in 
less crime because many judges may not impose the longer penalty 
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and the marginal deterrent impact of sentence hikes decreases as 
sentences become more severe. They explained the latter point as 
follows: 
That is, the relative deterrent effect of a year versus a month is 
much stronger than the relative deterrent effect of 6 years versus 5 
years. Thus, it is by no means self-evident, especially given the low 
likelihood of detection, that there is a significant pool of potential 
mules who are not deterred by a 5-year expected sentence but 
would be deterred by a 10-year expected sentence.133 
Even a mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking does not seem 
to reduce drug crime or drug use. A study analyzing the impact of the 
death penalty for drug trafficking in Malaysia134 noted: 
The actual data on Malaysia’s operation of its mandatory death 
penalty for drug traffickers demonstrate that Malaysia’s solution to 
the drug problem is not effective, nor is it one that other countries 
should emulate. While it is impossible to say what would have 
happened in Malaysia without the enactment of section 39B [which 
imposes the mandatory penalty], domestic drug use remains at the 
high levels it reached before the enactment of the mandatory death 
penalty. Malaysia’s experience demonstrates the application of a 
“drug war” model to the drug problem. In spite of draconian 
measures—including over a hundred executions, hundreds of death 
penalties imposed, the conversion of a huge paramilitary police 
force from fighting communists to fighting drugs, emergency trial 
processes that circumvent many due process protections, and a 
police force unfettered by search warrants—hundreds of thousands 
of Malaysians are still dependent on drugs, and tens of thousands of 
Malaysians are trafficking in drugs to meet those needs.135 
C. Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is often used as a basis for longer sentences. 
Incapacitation aims to protect the community by confining offenders 
to imprisonment, during which time they can no longer commit 
offenses. The effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be judged by the 
height of the prison wall. Imprisonment as a means of community 
protection is only effective if but for being imprisoned, the offender 
would have committed a further offense.136 With this in mind, two 
 
133 Id. at 194–95. 
134 Technically the death penalty is mandatory for serious drug offences, but this is 
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135 Sidney L. Harring, Death, Drugs and Development: Malaysia’s Mandatory Death 
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forms of incapacitation have been advanced. The first is selective 
incapacitation. This form focuses on the individual offender, and its 
success is contingent upon distinguishing between offenders who will 
reoffend from those who will not. 
Most of the research in this area has been directed towards 
predicting which serious offenders will reoffend. In this regard, the 
focus has been offenders who commit violent and sexual offenses. 
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data regarding the 
capacity of any discipline to predict future criminal behavior noted 
that predictive techniques “tend to invite overestimation of the 
amount of incapacitation to be expected from marginal increments of 
imprisonment.”137 More recent actuarial tools that have been 
developed to score a person’s level of risk by mapping their profile to 
variables that are known risk factors. Structured professional 
judgment and/or criminogenic needs tools also use a range of 
variables138 but are designed to be more nuanced than actuarial tools 
because they aim to not only predict the likelihood of violence but 
also the imminence and severity and possible targets of the risk.139 
Despite this, more recent attempts to accurately predict dangerousness 
in the context of violent and sexual offenses have proven to be 
deficient.140 
All predictive tools use prior criminal history as a key variable. 
This has generally proven to be an unreliable indicator.141 A New 
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South Study focused on offenders who committed serious violent 
offenses142 in 1994 and were released from custody no later than 
2009. There were 435 such offenders and the tracking showed that by 
September 2011, seventy-three offenders had not committed another 
offense involving a serious degree of violence—meaning that 83.2% 
did not commit such an offense.143 And in fact the offenders that were 
least likely to reoffend were those convicted of drug offenses.144 
While selective incapacitation does not work, general 
incapacitation is more effective in reducing crime.145 General 
incapacitation involves imprisoning offenders simply because they 
have committed a criminal offense on the basis that while in prison 
they cannot inflict harm in the general community. Little or no effort 
is normally made to predict future offending patterns, whether on the 
basis of previous criminal history or other considerations.146 There is 
no clear line between selective and general incapacitation and the 
difference is often simply one of degree. Once large numbers of 
offenders are imprisoned on the basis of predictive criteria that are 
demonstrably inaccurate then a process that may have initially had the 
appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a system of general 
incapacitation. All jurisdictions impose a recidivist premium and 
there has been escalation of penalties for certain crime, such as drug 
offenses.147 This has effectively evolved into a process of general 
incapacitation. 
Theoretically, general incapacitation should work: the more people 
who are in prison, the less people there will necessarily be who could 
commit crime in the general community. Accordingly, it should 
follow that this will reduce the crime rate in absolute terms. It should 
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also reduce crime in a relative sense. This is because people who 
commit crime are disproportionately from one sector of the 
community: the lower socioeconomic group. Poor people are grossly 
over-represented in jails across the world.148 Thus, imprisoning large 
numbers of poor people should reduce crime not only the number of 
crime offenses, but also the number of crimes per non-prison 
population. 
Most of the research into the testing the general incapacitation 
model has been undertaken in the United States, presumably because 
of the unprecedented increase in the prison population over the past 
thirty years. The weight of evidence supports the view that general 
incapacitation works. 
In the United States between 1990 and 2009: 
(a) the rate of violent crime in the United States dropped by more 
than 60%, with most of the decline being recorded after 1996; 
(b) the violent victimization rates per 1,000 people aged twelve 
years or older dropped from forty-four to seventeen.149 
During this period the imprisonment rate rose from 1.15 million to 
2.3 million prisoners.150 At face value, these figures suggest a causal 
link between imprisoning greater numbers of offenders and an 
effective reduction in the crime rate. 
As noted above, William Spelman has calculated that up to 21% of 
crime reduction is attributable to the increased rate of 
imprisonment.151 Other studies support the success of incapacitation 
but remain equally unclear about its precise impact. According to 
literature examined by Roger Warren, a 10% increase in 
 
148 See, e.g., STEEN BOX, RECISSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 96 (1987) (reviewing 
sixteen major studies between income inequality and crime and concluding that income 
inequality is strongly related to crime); Pat Carlen, Crime, Inequality and Sentencing, in A 
READER ON PUNISHMENT 309 (R.A Duff & D. Garland eds., 1994). Prison numbers 
illustrate this quite graphically. In Australia, the rate of indigenous imprisonment is 
fourteen times higher than the general population’s; AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 
available at http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4512.0Main%20 
Features2Mar%202011?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4512.0&issue=Mar
%202011&num=&view=. 
149 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 
VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS, 1973–2008 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content 
/glance/tables/viortrdtab.cfm. The rate of decline in other forms of crime was similar. 
150 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2009 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab 
.cfm. 
151 Spelman, supra note 118. See also BLUMSTEIN & WALLMAN, supra note 118. 
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imprisonment rates produces a 2-4% reduction in the crime rate; 
however most of this relates only to non-violent offenses.152 
While general incapacitation seems to have some validity, one 
constant finding is that it is usually most effective in relation to minor 
crime, although some success can also be achieved in relation to more 
serious forms of offending.153 This is because minor offenders 
reoffend more frequently than serious offenders. 
The most wide ranging study of the trajectory of offenders in 
Australia was undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and 
released in August 2010, in a report titled, An Analysis of Repeat 
Imprisonment Trends in Australia.154 
The report is based on a fourteen-year longitudinal study for the 
period July 1, 1993, to June 30, 2007. The study grouped prisoners 
into two cohorts. The first consisted of those released between July 1, 
1994, and June 30, 1997. This consisted of 28,584 people. The second 
comprised prisoners released between July 1, 2000, and June 30, 
2004. It consisted of 26,700 people. The study compared recidivism 
rates from both cohorts within three years from release. It also 
examined the ten-year re-imprisonment rate for the earlier cohort. 
Most generally, the report noted that the number of prisoners with 
prior imprisonment grew at a rate of 3.2% each year, 155 although this 
was not steady—with the rate ranging from 56% to 62%.156 The most 
illuminating data relates to the 1994 to 1997 release cohort, given that 
the tracking for these offenders was for ten years, as opposed to only 
three years. The report noted that for the 1994 to 1997 cohort, about 
20% were re-imprisoned within two years; one-quarter were re-
imprisoned within three years, and 40% by the end of the ten-year 
survey period.157 Moreover, it emerged that prisoners with prior 
imprisonment were twice as likely as first timers to return to prisoners 
(50% compared to 25% imprisonment rates, respectively from ten 
 
152 See Warren, supra note 119, at 585, 594 and the references cited therein. 
153 Don Weatherburn, Jiuzhao Hua & Steve Moffatt, How Much Crime Does Prison 
Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary, 93 CRIME & JUST. BULL. (2006), 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb93.pdf/$file/cjb93
.pdf; B. VOLLAARD, PREVENTING CRIME THROUGH SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION, Center 
Discussion Paper No. 2010-141 (2010). 
154 JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AN ANALYSIS OF REPEAT IMPRISONMENT 
TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA USING PRISONER CENSUS DATA FROM 1994 TO 2007 (2010), 
available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A4BE29D 
48CA25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031_aug%202010.pdf. 
155 Id. at 12. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 16. 
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years after release).158 When a logistic regression was applied to this 
data it emerged that the odds ratio that a prisoner with a number of 
previous prison terms would be imprisoned were 2.9 times that of a 
first-time prisoner.159 
The date regarding imprisonment for offense type is telling for the 
purposes of this article. For the 1994 to 1997 release cohort it was 
noted that by June 30, 2007, the offenders who were most commonly 
re-imprisoned (for any offense) were those sentenced for burglary 
(58%); theft (53%) and robbery (45%); least were those convicted of 
drug offenses (24%) and sexual assault (21%).160 Thus, prior drug 
offending is less indicative of a risk of recidivism than offending for 
nearly all other offenses. This is also reflected in the pattern of re-
imprisonment for the same offense type. The data also looked for 
criminal specialization by offense type. It noted that for the above 
cohort, members who were most likely to be re-imprisoned for the 
same offense were those initially convicted of burglary (31%); 
causing injury (23%); theft (19%); road traffic offenses (19%); road 
traffic offenses (18%). The rate for illicit drug offenses was 13%. 
Thus, drug offenders reoffend at the lower rate than most other types 
of offender and the extent of specialization for this offense is low. 
Thus, it seems that detaining drug offenders longer to satisfy the 
objective of incapacitation is not justifiable given the low rate of re-
offending for drug offending. This conclusion seems to apply not only 
when the looking at the impact on drug crime, but also other forms of 
crime. In the United States a wide ranging survey of the link between 
harsher between penalties for drug offenders and violent and property 
crime was undertaken in paper published in 2004, by IIyana 
Kuziemko and Steven D Levitt.161 As noted in Part II of this article, 
the paper noted that during the survey (1980 to 2000) the number of 
offenders imprisoned for drug related offenders in the two decades 
from 1980 to 2000 increased fifteen-fold.162 
The paper concluded that despite this, the rate of imprisonment of 
drug offenders, there was only a reduction of between 1 and 3% of 
violent and property crime.163 The authors note that the contribution 
 
158 Id. at 19. 
159 Id. at 23. 
160 Id. at 30. 
161 See Kuziemko and Levitt, supra note 12, at 2044. 
162 Id. By 2006, this figure had increased to nearly 500,000. Bewley-Taylor et al., supra 
note 13, at 3. 
163 Kuziemko and Levitt, supra note 12, at 2062. 
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to the crime drop from increased incarceration of drug offenders is 
minor when compared to the crime drop of approximately 50% (in 
most categories) in the United States in the 1990s. The authors 
speculate that increased imprisonment of drug offenders may impact 
on violent and property crime in a number of ways, including reduced 
opportunity for drug offenders to engage in other forms of crime as a 
result of the incapacitation effects of prison.164 The authors conclude 
that: 
The question of foremost public policy interest related to our work 
is whether or not the investment in drug-offender incarceration has 
been cost effective. False First, for typical values of the costs of 
crime, even the most generous estimates of the crime reduction 
attributable to prison (Levitt, 1996) suggest that current levels of 
incarceration are excessive. Thus, it is not easy to justify drug 
imprisonment based on associated declines in violent and property 
crime alone. . . . Furthermore, even if one could conclude that the 
recent increase in drug punishment were cost effective, it might 
nonetheless be the case that alternative public policy approaches 
such as legalization accompanied by large taxes (e.g., Becker et al., 
2001), or a greater emphasis on treatment would not have 
accomplished the same objective more cheaply.165 
The authors did not look at the impact of increased drug penalties 
on drug crime, although they noted that this may have increased the 
prices of cocaine by 5-15%166 and speculated that this may have 
reduced cocaine consumption, although there was no evidence for this 
assumption. 
As for the incapacitative impacts of harsher drug laws on drug 
offenses in the United States, the evidence is unclear; but some 
studies indicate there is no positive impact: 
It is, however, difficult to find a correlation between trends in 
incarceration and a reduction of the market since research suggests 
that the US states with higher rates of drug related incarceration 
experienced higher not lower rates of drug use.167 
Thus, the data suggests that imprisoning drug offenders for longer 
periods will have little to no impact on the availability of drug; the 
amount of drug crime or other forms of crime. 
 
164 Id. at 2056. 
165 Id. at 2062–63. 
166 Id. at 2054. The impact of the price of other drugs was not considered. 
167 Bewley-Taylor et al., supra note 13. See also DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN 
ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY (2005). 
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D. Overview of Effectiveness of Drug Policies 
There are a number of different means that have been used to limit 
the use and availability of drugs. In addition to increased criminal 
penalties, other measures include education campaigns regarding the 
health dangers of illicit drugs and increased police and other 
surveillance techniques to detect drugs. 
It is not tenable to isolate the impact of any one policy. The 
analysis above suggests that it is unlikely that severe penalties for 
drug offenders are capable of meaningfully limiting the availability of 
drugs. The efficacy of the sentencing system to achieve the goals of 
specific deterrence, general deterrence and incapacitation is doubtful. 
This applies equally in relation to drug offenses. 
This is perhaps most evidently illustrated by the impact of the war 
on drugs at the global level. Cumulatively, at the global level the 
attempt to reduce the amount of drugs seems to have failed. The best 
estimates indicate that in the decade leading to 2008, there has been a 
34.5% increase in the consumption of opiates.168 The consumption of 
cocaine and cannabis has been increased less, but still at significant 
levels—27% and 8.5% respectively.169 It has also failed in the 
Australian context. Australians spend more than $7 billion annually 
on illegal drugs.170 And during this time, the price for commonly 
trafficked drugs has decreased.171 
E. Can Proportionality Justify Severe Punishment for Drug 
Offenders? 
It may yet be arguable that harsh prison terms are appropriate for 
drug offenders on the basis on the proportionality principle. In its 
simplest and most persuasive form, the proportionality principle is the 
view that the punishment should equal the crime. The principle of 
proportionality (at least in theory) operates to “restrain excessive, 
arbitrary and capricious punishment”172 by requiring that punishment 
 
168 REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, supra note 2, at 4. 
169 Id. 
170 Amy Corderoy, Nation’s $7b Drug Splurge, THE AGE (June 22, 2013), 
http://www.theage.com.au/national/nations-7b-drug-splurge-20130621-2ooe3.html. 
171 Ian Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by Weight: Proposed Changes to the Commonwealth 
Code Serious Drug Offences, 36 CRIM. L.J. 265 (2012). The same applies in the United 
States (at least for cocaine and heroin). Bewley-Taylor et al., supra note 13, at 11. 
172 Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 489, 492 (1994). 
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must not exceed the gravity of the offense, even where it seems 
certain that the offender will immediately re-offend.173 
As the High Court of Australia stated in Hoare v The Queen,174 “a 
basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as 
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in 
the light of its objective circumstances.”175 In fact, in Veen v The 
Queen (No 1)176 and Veen (No 2) v The Queen (No 2),177 the High 
Court stated that proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. It is 
considered so important that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of 
community protection, which at various times has also been declared 
as the most important aim of sentencing.178 Proportionality has been 
given statutory recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.179 
Proportionality is a requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten 
states in the United States.180 The precise considerations that inform 
the proportionality principle vary in those jurisdictions, but generally 
there are six relevant criteria: 
(1) Whether the penalty shocks a reasonable sense of decency; 
 
173 See, e.g., R. v Jenner (1956) CLR 495 (Austl.), in which the court reduced a term of 
imprisonment despite believing that “it appeared likely that [the offender] would commit a 
crime as soon as he was released from prison.” 
174 (1989) 167 CLR 348 (Austl.). 
175 Id. at 354 (emphasis altered). 
176 (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Austl.). 
177 (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Austl.). 
178 See, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 (Austl.). 
179 The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a) (Austl.) provides that one of the purposes 
of sentencing is to impose just punishment (s 5(1)(a)), and that in sentencing an offender 
the court must have regard to the gravity of the offence (s 5(2)(c)) and the offender’s 
culpability and degree of responsibility (s 5(2)(d)). The Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) 
(Austl.) states that the sentence must be “commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence” (s 6(1)), and the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7(1)(a) (Austl.) provides 
that the sentence must be “just and appropriate.” In the Northern Territory and 
Queensland, the relevant sentencing statute provides that the punishment imposed on the 
offender must be just in all the circumstances (Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1)(a) (Austl.); 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a) (Austl.), while, in South Australia, the 
emphasis is upon ensuring that “the defendant is adequately punished for the offence” 
(Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(j) (Austl.). The need for a sentencing 
court to “adequately punish” the offender is also fundamental to the sentencing of 
offenders for Commonwealth matters (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k)). The same 
phrase is used in the New South Wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 
3A(a) (Austl.). 
180 This is discussed in Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 241, 242 (2012). The article focused on the operation of the principle in 
Illinois, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. 
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(2) The gravity of the crime; 
(3) The prior criminal history of the offender; 
(4) The legislative objective relating to the sanction; 
(5) A comparison of the sanction imposed on the accused with the 
penalty that would be imposed in other jurisdictions; and 
(6) A comparison of the sanction with other penalties for similar 
and related offenses in the same jurisdiction.181 
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment has been applied sparingly in the sentencing domain. To 
the extent that it has been applied in this area, it has been mainly in 
relation to proscribing the death penalty to certain forms of crimes 
(non-homicide offenses)182 and criminals (juveniles)183 In determining 
the scope of this limitation, the Supreme Court has taken into account 
international standards relating to appropriate levels of punishment.184 
In relation to noncapital sentences, the Supreme Court has endorsed 
the concept of proportionality as being a constraint on the level of 
punishment, but the concept has not been developed with any degree 
of precision and can only be invoked to prohibit sanctions that contain  
“gross disproportionality.”185 
Broken down to its core features, proportionality has two limbs. 
The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second is the 
harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a quantitative 
component—the two limbs must be matched. In order for the 
principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to 
the harshness of the penalty. 
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Some commentators have argued that proportionality is so vague as 
to be meaningless, in light of the fact that there is no stable and clear 
manner in which the punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper 
Ryberg notes that one of the key and damaging criticisms of 
proportionality is that it “presupposes something which is not there, 
namely, some objective measure of appropriateness between crime 
and punishment.”186 The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect of 
proportionality is that there is no stable and clear manner in which the 
punishment can be matched to the crime. Ryberg further notes that in 
order to give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank crimes, rank 
punishments, and anchor the scales.187 
There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. And as noted by Ian 
Leader-Elliott and George Fletcher, the application of the 
proportionality principle is especially difficult in the case of offenses, 
such as drug offenses, where there is no direct, clear and observable 
harm caused by the crime: 
The principle of proportionality applies to offenders who traffic in 
drugs no less than it does to offenders who inflict injury or death. In 
the trafficking offences, however, there is not the same intuitive, 
retributive ground for determining a punishment to fit the offence.  
There is no natural measure of proportionality in offences that are 
supposed to secure the common good. The American theorist 
George Fletcher makes the point in his discussion of crimes of lese 
majeste: 
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in turn 
requires sensitivity to the injury inflicted . . . .The more the 
victim suffers, the more pain should be inflicted on the 
criminal. In the context of betrayal, the gears of this basic 
principle of justice, the lex talionis, fail to engage the problem. 
The theory of punishment does not mesh with the crime when 
there is no tangible harm, no friction against the physical 
welfare of the victim.188 
 
186 JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 184 (2004). 
187 Id. at 185. (Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the proportionality 
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SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 122 (2005). 
188 Ian Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by weight: Proposed changes to the Commonwealth 
Code’s serious drug offences, 36 CRIM. L.J. 265, 277–78 (2012) (quoting GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993)) 
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While doctrinally it has been argued that there is a manner in 
which firmer content could be accorded to proportionality doctrine,189 
an exact matching of offense severity and penalty harshness is not 
feasible in light of the current understanding of proportionalism. 
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and resolved 
for current purposes. Irrespective of the precise manner in which 
harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a cardinal criterion is the 
extent to which it sets back the interests and welfare of victims. 
Accordingly, homicide offenses are the most serious. Offenses 
causing considerable degrees of permanent impairment (whether 
physical or mental) also rate highly. It is also assumed by many 
theorists190 that culpability is an element of offense severity. To this 
end, offenses that involve the infliction of deliberate harm are worse 
than those where harm is caused recklessly or unintentionally. 
Illicit drug use rarely results in permanent serious harm to users. 
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that suppliers want to harm 
the users of their drugs—this would, in fact, be self-defeating. 
Thus, it is clear that drug offenses are less serious than homicide 
and serious assault and sexual offenses; and the penalties should 
reflect this ordering. To the extent that proportionality is a guiding 
determinant in relation to drug offenses, the overstated impact of 
illicit drugs dilutes the seriousness of the offense and this must lead to 
a corresponding reduction in appropriate penalty.191 
CONCLUSION 
Drug distribution offenses are a serious crime and result in the 
availability of substances that cause a large amount of damage to the 
community. But no drug offense is ever as bad as the offenses such as 
homicide, rape and assault causing serious injury. Yet, perversely 
drug offenses are punished at least as severely as these offenses. 
 
189 Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in 
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The main reason for the ever-increasing tariff for drug offenses is 
the worship paid by the courts and legislatures to the notion of general 
deterrence. The theory is that if we send drug offenders to jail for long 
periods, other potential drug offenders will rethink their cost/benefit 
assessment of the activity and decide to get a day job instead. The 
theory is a good one—it sounds logical. But science shows that the 
theory is wrong. Study after study has established that longer jail 
terms (and even the death penalty) do not reduce crime. The only 
threat that does reduce crime is the threat of being apprehended. 
Hence, more uniform police on the streets reduces crime. It seems 
that the main cost/benefit assessment undertaken by offenders is 
whether or not they are likely to be caught; they do not project far 
enough to consider exactly what will happen if they are caught. The 
abject failure of general deterrence theory is evident from the fact that 
in virtually every city block in the world, people can readily purchase 
illicit drugs. 
The key findings from the above analysis are the following: 
1. Decriminalization of illicit drugs probably reduces the level of 
drug use and the harm caused by drugs; 
2. Drug distribution offenses are not as serious as conduct, which 
causes direct intentional harm to the bodily or sexual integrity 
of victims, such as homicide and rape; 
3. Harsh penalties for drug offenses do not reduce drug crime 
because the goals of specific deterrence, marginal general 
deterrence and incapacitation in the context of drug offenses are 
not effective; and 
4. There is nothing that can be achieved by a twenty-five-year 
term of imprisonment for drug offending that cannot be 
achieved by, a much shorter term. The bulk of a twenty-five-
year term is gratuitous and punishes the community. 
J.P. Caulkins and P.A. Reuter, in 2006 asked would the United 
States be “worse off if it contented itself with 250,000 rather than 
500,000 drug prisoners?”192 In the Australian context as we have seen 
there are approximately 3,500 drug offenders. A decade ago, the 
number was approximately 2,000. If Australian had 1,500 less drug 
offenders in jail today, would Australia have more drugs? 
Resoundingly, the answer to both questions is no. 
 
192 J.P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Reorienting U.S. Drug Policy, 23 ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH. 79, 85 (2006). 
